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ABSTRACT 
We assessed three important criteria of forecastability—simplicity, certainty, and variability. 
Climate is complex due to many causal variables and their variable interactions. There is 
uncertainty about causes, effects, and data. Using evidence-based (scientific) forecasting 
principles, we determined that a naïve “no change” extrapolation method was the appropriate 
benchmark. To be useful to policy makers, a proposed forecasting method would have to provide 
forecasts that were substantially more accurate than the benchmark. We calculated benchmark 
forecasts against the UK Met Office Hadley Centre’s annual average thermometer data from 1850 
through 2007. For 20- and 50-year horizons the mean absolute errors were 0.18°C and 0.24°C. 
The accuracy of forecasts from our naïve model is such that even perfect forecasts would be 
unlikely to help policy makers. We nevertheless evaluated the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s 1992 forecast of 0.03°C-per-year temperature increases. The small sample of 
errors from ex ante forecasts for 1992 through 2008 was practically indistinguishable from the 
naïve benchmark errors. To get a larger sample and evidence on longer horizons we backcast 
successively from 1974 to 1850. Averaged over all horizons, IPCC errors were more than seven-
times greater than errors from the benchmark. Relative errors were larger for longer backcast 
horizons.  
Key words: backcasting, climate model, decision making, ex ante forecasts, out-of-sample errors, 
predictability, public policy, relative absolute errors, unconditional forecasts. 
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Introduction 
One of the principles of scientific forecasting is to ensure that a series can be predicted 
(Armstrong, 2001, Principle #1.4). We applied the principle to long-term forecasting of global 
mean temperatures by examining the unconditional ex ante forecast errors from a naïve 
benchmark model. By ex ante forecasts, we mean forecasts for periods that were not taken into 
account when the forecasting model was developed—it is trivial to construct a model that fits 
known data better than a naïve model can.  
Benchmark errors are the standard by which to determine whether alternative scientifically-based 
forecasting methods can provide useful forecasts. When benchmark errors are large, it is possible 
that alternative methods would provide useful forecasts. When benchmark errors are small, it is 
less likely that other methods will be able to provide improvements in accuracy that are useful to 
decision makers. 
 
Conditions of forecastability 
By forecastability we mean the ability to improve upon a naïve benchmark model. Three 
important conditions of forecastability are variability, simplicity, and certainty.  
 
Variability 
The first step in testing whether a forecasting method can help is to check for variability. If little 
or no variability is expected, there is no need to make a forecast  
In the case of global mean temperatures, warnings since 1990 from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and others (Hansen 2008) that we are experiencing dangerous 
manmade global warming suggest variability. Indeed, when we examined local, regional and 
global mean temperature data we found that changes are common. For example, Exhibit 1 
displays Antarctic temperature data from the ice-core record for the 800,000 years to 1950. The 
data are in the form of temperature, relative to the average for the last one-thousand-years of the 
record (950 to 1950 AD), in degrees Celsius. The data show long-term variations. The three most 
recent values are roughly 1 to 3°C warmer than the reference thousand-year average, which is at 
0°C in the graph. Moreover, there was high variability around trends and the trends were unstable 
over all time periods. In other words, trends appear to be positive about as often as they were 
negative. 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE 
800,000-year Record of Temperature Change 
 
 
Simplicity 
To the extent that a situation is complex, it is more difficult to forecast. This is especially 
important when complexity is high relative to the variability in the series. For example, daily 
movements in stock market prices involve complex interactions among many variables. As a 
consequence daily stock price movements are characterized as a random walk. The naive no-
change benchmark method for forecasting stock prices has defeated alternative investment 
strategies. Attempts to improve upon this model have led to massive losses on occasion, such as 
with the failure of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in the late-1990s. 
Climate change is also subject to many interacting variables. The Sun is clearly one important 
influence on Earthly temperatures. The Sun’s intensity varies, the Earth-Sun distance varies, and 
so does the geometrical orientation of the Earth toward the Sun. The approximately 11-year solar 
activity cycle, for example, is typically associated with a global average temperature range of 
approximately 0.4°C between the warmest and coldest parts of the cycle, and a much larger range 
near the poles (Camp and Tung 2007). Variations in the irradiance of the Sun over decades and 
centuries also influence the Earth’s climate (Soon 2009). Other influences on both shorter and 
longer-term temperatures include the type and extent of clouds, the extent and reflectivity of 
snow and ice, ocean currents and the release and absorption of heat by the oceans. 
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Certainty 
There is high uncertainty with respect to the direction and magnitude of the various postulated 
causal factors.  
Those who warn of dangerous manmade global warming assert that it is being caused by 
increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere as a result of human 
emissions. However, the relationship between human emissions and total atmospheric 
concentrations is not well-understood due to the complexity of global carbon cycling via diverse 
physical, chemical, and biological interactions among the CO2 reservoirs of the Earth system. For 
example, 650,000 years of ice core data suggest that atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have 
followed temperature changes by several hundreds to several thousands of years (Soon 2007). 
Moreover, there are debates among scientists as to whether additions to atmospheric CO2 play a 
role of any importance in climate change (e.g., Carter et al. 2006; Soon 2007; Lindzen 2009).  
There is also uncertainty about temperature series that have been used by the IPCC. These have 
been challenged on the basis that they are not true global averages, and that they suffer from “heat 
island” effects whereby weather stations that were once beyond the edge of town have become 
progressively surrounded by urban development. Other influences on temperature readings 
include the substitution of electronic thermometers, which are sensitive to heat eddies; the 
reduction of the number of temperature stations (especially in remote areas); and maintenance 
associated with the housing of the temperature gauges (the boxes are supposed to be white). 
Anthony Watts and colleagues have documented problems with weather station readings at 
surfacestations.org. Analysis by McKitrick and Michaels (2007) suggested that the size of the 
surface warming in the last two decades of the 20th century was overestimated by a factor of two.  
Finally, long time-series of reliable global and regional temperature data and of the host of 
plausible causal variables are not available.  
In sum, two of three important conditions of forecastability are not met: uncertainty and 
complexity suggest that climate change will have low predictability. 
 
An appropriate benchmark model 
We followed the guidance provided by comparative empirical studies from all areas of 
forecasting. The guidelines are summarized in Armstrong (2001) and are available on the public 
service website ForPrin.com.  
Given the uncertainty and the complexity of our long-term global average temperature forecasting 
problem, the lack of agreement among climate scientists on the net directional effects of causal 
forces, and the lack of consistent long-term trends in the data, the appropriate benchmark is a 
naïve, no-change, forecasting model. 
We used the HadCRUt3 “best estimate” annual average temperature differences from 1850 to 
2007 from the U.K. Met Office Hadley Centre (Hadley) 1 to examine the benchmark errors for 
climate change (Exhibit 2).  
                                                        
1 Obtained from http://hadobs.metoffice.com/hadcrut3/diagnostics/global/nh+sh/annual on 9 October, 2008. 
INSERT EXHIBIT 2 
 
 
Errors from the benchmark model 
We used each year’s mean global temperature as a naïve forecast of each subsequent year and 
calculated the errors relative to the measurements for those years. For example, the year 1850 
temperature measurement from Hadley was our forecast of the average temperature for each year 
from 1851 through 1950. We calculated the differences between our naïve forecast and the 
Hadley measurement for each year of this 100-year forecast horizon. 
In this way we obtained from the Hadley data 157 error estimates for one-year-ahead forecasts, 
156 for two-year-ahead forecasts, and so on up to 58 error estimates for 100-year-ahead forecasts; 
a total of 10,750 forecasts across all horizons 
Exhibit 3 shows that mean absolute errors from our naïve model increased from less than 0.1°C 
for one-year-ahead forecasts to less than 0.4°C for 100-year-ahead forecasts. Maximum absolute 
errors increased from less than 0.4°C for one-year-ahead forecasts to less than 1.0°C for 100-
year-ahead forecasts. 
Overwhelmingly, errors were no-more-than 0.5°C, as is shown in Exhibit 4. For horizons less-
than-65-years, fewer than one-in-eight of our ex ante forecasts were more than 0.5°C different 
from the Hadley measurement. All forecasts for horizons up-to-80-years and more than 95% of 
forecasts for horizons from-81-to-100-years were within 1°C of the Hadley figure. The overall 
maximum error from all 10,750 forecasts for all horizons was 1.08°C; which was from an 87-
year-ahead forecast for the year 1998—the hottest year of a major El Niño cycle. 
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INSERT EXHIBIT 3 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 4 
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Performance of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projections 
As the naïve benchmark model performs so well it is hard to argue what additional benefits public 
policy makers would get from a better model. Governments did however, via the United Nations, 
establish the IPCC to search for a better model. The IPCC forecasts provide an opportunity to 
illustrate the use of our naïve benchmark.  
Green and Armstrong (2008) analyzed the IPCC procedures and concluded that they violated 72 
of the principles for proper scientific forecasting. For important forecasts, it is critical that all 
proper procedures are followed. An invalid forecasting method might provide an accurate 
forecast by chance, but this would not qualify it as an appropriate method. Nevertheless, because 
the IPCC forecasts influenced major policy decisions, we compare its predictions with our naïve 
benchmark.  
To test any forecasting method, it is necessary to exclude data that were used to develop the 
model; that is, the testing must be done using out-of-sample data. The most obvious out-of-
sample data are the observations that occurred after the forecast was made. There have, however, 
been only 17 observations of annual global average temperature since the IPCC’s 1992 forecasts 
(including an estimate for 2008) and so we decided to also employ “backcasting”.  
Dangerous manmade global warming became an issue of public concern after NASA scientist 
James Hansen testified on the subject to the U.S. Congress on 23 June 1988 (McKibben 2007). 
The IPCC (2007) authors explain however that “Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 
1750” (p. 2). As a consequence we used the Hadley data from 1974 through to the beginning of 
the series in 1850 for our backcast test.  
 
We used the IPCC’s 1992 forecast, which was an update of their 1990 forecast, for our 
demonstration. The 1992 forecast was for an increase of 0.03°C per year (IPCC 1990 p. xi, IPCC 
1992 p.17). We used this forecast because it has had a big influence on policymakers, coming out 
as it did in time for the Rio Earth Summit, which produced inter alia Agenda 21 and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. According to the United Nations web page 
on the Summit 2, “The Earth Summit influenced all subsequent UN conferences…”. Using the 
1992 forecast also allowed for the longest ex ante forecast test. Spreadsheets of our analysis are 
available at publicpolicyforecasting.com.  
 
There remains the unresolved problem that the IPCC authors knew in retrospect that there had 
been a broadly upward trend in the Hadley temperature series. From 1850 to 1974 there were 66 
years in which the temperature increased from the previous year and 59 in which it declined. 
There will, therefore, be some positive trend that would provide a better model for the backcast 
test period than would our naïve benchmark, and so the benchmark is disadvantaged for the 
period under consideration. In other words, although we treat this as an out-of-sample period, it 
presumably influenced the thinking of the IPCC experts such that their forecasting model likely 
fits the 1850 to 1975 trend more closely than it would had they been unaware of the data. Recall, 
however, that the temperature variations shown by the longer temperature series in Exhibit 1 
 that the trend will continue in the future.  suggest that there is no assurance
                                                        
2 http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html  
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Evaluation method 
We followed the procedure that we had used for our benchmark model and calculated absolute 
errors as the unsigned difference between the IPCC forecast, or backcast, and the Hadley figure 
for the same year. We then compared these IPCC forecast errors with those from the benchmark 
model using the cumulative relative absolute error or CumRAE (Armstrong 2001).  
The CumRAE is the sum across all forecast horizons of the errors (ignoring signs) from the 
method being evaluated divided by the equivalent sum of benchmark errors. For example, a 
CumRAE of 1.0 would indicate that the evaluated-method errors and benchmark errors came to 
the same total while a figure of 0.8 would indicate indicates that the evaluated-method errors 
were in total 20% lower than the benchmark’s.  
We are concerned about forecasting accuracy by forecast horizon and so calculated error scores 
for each horizon, and then averaged across the horizons. Thus, the CumRAEs we report are the 
sum of the mean absolute errors across horizons divided by the equivalent sum of benchmark 
errors. 
Forecasts from 1992 through 2008 using 1992 IPCC model 
We created an IPCC forecast series from 1992 to 2008 by starting with the 1991 Hadley figure 
and adding 0.03°C per year. In the case of forecasts, as opposed to backcasts, it is possible to also 
test the IPCC model against the University of Alabama’s data of global near surface temperature 
measured from satellites using microwave sounding units (UAH), which are available from 1979. 
We created another forecast series by starting with the 1991 UAH figure.  
Benchmarks for the two series were the 1991 Hadley figure and the 1991 UAH figure, 
respectively, for all years. This process, by including estimates for 2008 from both sources, gave 
us two small samples of 17 years of out-of-sample forecasts. We found the 1992 IPCC model 
forecasts were less accurate than the forecasts from our naïve benchmark. When tested against 
Hadley measures (data plotted in Exhibit 5), IPCC errors were essentially the same as those from 
our benchmark forecasts (CumRAE 0.98); they were nearly twice as large (CumRAE 1.82) when 
tested against the UAH satellite measures (Exhibit 6). 
INSERT EXHIBIT 5 
 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 6 
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We employed successive forecasting by using each year of the Hadley data from 1991 out to 
2007 in turn as the base from which to forecast from one up to 17 years ahead. We obtained a 
total of 136 forecasts from each of the 1992 IPCC model and our benchmark model over horizons 
from one to 17 years. We found that averaged across all 17 forecast horizons, the 1992 IPCC 
model forecast errors for the period 1992 to 2008 were 16% smaller than errors from our 
benchmark; the CumRAE was 0.84.  The average benchmark and 1992-IPCC forecast errors for 
each of the 17 horizons are shown in Exhibit 7; the IPCC errors were large in the longest two 
horizons, as an inspection of Exhibit 5 would lead one to expect. 
We repeated the successive forecasting test using UAH data. The 1992 IPCC model forecast 
errors for the period 1992 to 2008 were 5% smaller than errors from our benchmark (CumRAE 
0.95). The series are shown in Exhibit 8. The scale is the same as for Exhibit 7 (based on the 
Hadley series) for ease of comparison, but this means that the 17-year-horizon IPCC error is, at 
0.61°C, off the chart.  
INSERT EXHIBIT 7 
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INSERT EXHIBIT 8 
 
Assessed against the UAH data, the average of the mean errors for all 17 horizons was 0.215°C 
for rolling forecasts from the benchmark and 0.203°C for the IPCC model forecasts. The IPCC 
forecasts thus provided an error reduction of 0.012°C for this small sample. Such a small 
improvement would have no value to decisions makers. Indeed, it is hard to see how even a 
perfect forecast (representing an average error reduction of 0.215°C) would be useful in 
comparison to the already small benchmark error. 
The concern of policymakers is with long-term climate forecasting, and the ex ante analysis we 
have described was limited to a small sample of short-horizon forecasts. To address these 
limitations, we used backcasting. The procedure is described in Armstrong (1985, pp. 343-345). 
 
Backcasts from 1974 through 1850 using 1992 IPCC model 
We used the procedure of backcasting because, as we discussed earlier, the IPCC’s proposed 
forecasting model should be just as relevant going backwards in time from 1974 as it is going 
forward.  
We first created a single backcast series by starting with the 1975 Hadley figure and subtracting 
the 1992-IPCC-model’s 0.03°C from each year, starting with 1974, and repeated the process all 
the way back to 1851 with a backcast for 1850. Our naïve benchmark backcast was equal to the 
1975 Hadley figure for all years. This process provided backcast data for each of the 125 years. 
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The 1992 IPCC backcast errors totaled more than ten times the benchmark errors (CumRAE 
10.4). We also tested the 2007 IPCC’s weaker Scenario-B trend of 0.02°C p.a. (IPCC 2007, p. 
13), but it made little difference to the relative accuracy of the backcast; the 2007 IPCC errors 
were in total nearly seven times larger than the benchmark errors (CumRAE 6.72).  
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We then successively backcast by using each year from 1975 back to 1851 as the base from 
which to backcast from one up to 93 years back using the 1992 IPCC model and our benchmark 
model. This yielded a total of 7,550 backcasts covering the period 1974 to 1850 for horizons from 
one to 100 years. 
We found that across all forecast horizons, the 1992-IPCC-model backcast errors for the period 
were more than seven-times greater than errors from our benchmark (CumRAE 7.23). The 
relative errors increased rapidly with backcast horizon. For example for horizons one-through-10 
the CumRAE was 1.45, while for horizons 41-through-50 it was 6.77 and for horizons 91-
through-100 it was 12.6.  
 
Implications for climate policy 
To base public policy decisions on forecasts of global mean temperature one would have to show 
that changes are forecastable and that a valid evidence-based forecasting procedure would 
provide more accurate forecasts than those from the benchmark model. To our knowledge, this 
study is the first attempt to address these issues.  
We did not address the issue of forecasting the net benefits or cost of any climate change that 
might be forecast. Here again one would need to establish a benchmark forecast, presumably a 
model assuming that changes in either direction would have no net effects. Researchers who have 
examined this issue are not in agreement on what is the optimum temperature. 
Finally, success in forecasting climate change and the effects of climate change must then be 
followed by valid forecasts of the effects of alternative policies. And, again, one would need 
benchmark forecasts; presumably based on an assumption of taking no action, as that is typically 
the least costly. As we noted in Armstrong, Green and Soon (2008), this was overlooked in the 
U.S. Department of the Interior’s assessment of the polar bear issue.  
The problem is complex. A failure at any of one of the three stages of forecasting—temperature 
change, impacts of changes, and impacts of alternative policies—would imply that climate 
change policies have no scientific basis. 
Our findings suggest that the apparently hopeless task of forecasting climate change should be 
abandoned. 
Conclusions 
Our analyses showed that global mean temperatures are remarkably stable over policy-relevant 
horizons. The benchmark forecast is that the global mean temperature for each year for the rest of 
this century, as measured by UAH or similar, will be within 0.5°C of the 2008 figure.  
There is little room for improving the accuracy of forecasts from our naïve benchmark model. In 
fact, it is difficult to conceive what practical benefits could be gained by obtaining forecasts. 
While the Hadley temperature data from thermometers shown in Exhibit 2 in retrospect appeared 
to drift broadly upwards over the last century or so, the longer series in Exhibit 1 shows that such 
trends can occur naturally over long periods. Moreover there is some concern that the upward 
trend might be at least in part an artifact of measurement error (e.g., heat island effects) rather 
than a genuine global warming. Even if one puts these reservations aside, our analysis shows that 
errors from our naïve benchmark forecasts would have been so small that they would not have 
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been of concern to decision makers who relied on them. For all practical purposes, global mean 
temperatures are not forecastable. 
Earlier research has shown that the IPCC forecasting methods violated scientific forecasting 
principles and IPCC forecasts should not, therefore, be used for making public policy decisions. 
Our findings in this paper reinforce that conclusion. We showed that a naïve no-change 
benchmark model produces forecasts that are sufficiently accurate for public policy decision 
making, and that the IPCC’s forecasts are less accurate when tested against a large sample of ex 
ante observations.  
The small sample of 17 years of IPCC 1992-model forecasts was similar in overall accuracy to 
the naïve benchmark forecasts. Rolling forecasts from 1992 through 2007 using the IPCC’s 
model were only trivially more accurate than the benchmark forecasts and the mean error 
reduction of 0.012°C would not be useful for policy recommendations.  
Climate policy is concerned with longer horizons and so our small sample of short horizon 
forecasts was a weak test. To address these issues we tested the relative accuracy of the IPCC 
forecasts using rolling backcasts over horizons of up to 100 years. We found that the IPCC 
backcast errors were seven times larger than those from our naïve benchmark, and the relative 
errors increased as the backcast horizon increased. 
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